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Harvesting the “Forbidden Fruit” of
Biotechnology Research: Genetic Engineering,
International Law and the Patentability of
Higher Life Forms in Canada
Eugene C. Lim*
As the frontiers of science are constantly redefined by the emergence of new
technology, patent law often has to struggle to keep pace with the changing con-
ception of what constitutes a protectable “invention”. A key challenge facing pat-
ent law in the age of biotechnology lies in ascertaining the extent to which geneti-
cally engineered life forms should be protected. A major concern relates to whether
such life forms should be excluded from patentability on grounds of ordre public,
ethics and morality. This article critically explores the extent to which patent law in
Canada protects this “forbidden fruit” of biotechnological innovation, and com-
pares the position in Canada with that of the United States and the European
Union. The author argues that recent Canadian jurisprudence in the field of bio-
technology law has brought the Canadian position more in line with patent devel-
opments in other industrialized nations, although there continue to be differences
in the formal definition of “patentable subject matter”. The groundbreaking deci-
sion by the Supreme Court of Canada in Monsanto v Schmeiser marks the emer-
gence of a more permissive approach toward the patentability of genetically modi-
fied inventions — an approach that is more compatible with patent practices in the
United States and the European Union than the position taken earlier by the same
court in Harvard College v Canada. However, while genetically modified cells and
genes are now eligible for patent protection in Canada, entire organisms remain
unpatentable under existing Canadian law. Practically speaking, the distinction
drawn by the Schmeiser court between genetically modified “components” and ge-
netically modified “life forms” is artificial, because a patent over a genetically
modified cell effectively gives a patentee de facto control over the commercial ex-
ploitation of the entire organism. This article proposes that Canada should jettison
this artificial distinction and explicitly recognize life forms as patentable subject
matter if it wishes to play a more influential role in trade agreements such as the
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP). Embracing “life forms” as a
category of patentable subject matter would also make Canada a more attractive
* School of Law, City University of Hong Kong. This article was inspired in part by a
series of lectures that the author delivered on Canadian patent law and biotechnology in
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destination for biotechnology investment.
INTRODUCTION
Advances in biotechnology research have the potential to confer tremendous
benefits on humanity.1 From the development of cancer therapies to the production
of new crops, the “fruits” of biotechnological innovation offer the possibility of
providing solutions to global concerns such as the treatment of illness and the alle-
viation of human hunger.2 On the other hand, biotechnology and genetic engineer-
ing have also been characterized by some commentators as a means employed by
multinational corporations to “reinforce the imbalances of wealth and power which
perpetuate malnutrition, hunger and ill health”.3 The startling amount of power that
the genetic revolution has placed in the hands of corporations over our health and
food supply has prompted debate over the real beneficiaries of biotechnological
innovation.4 The much-touted “contributions” of biotechnology to society accord-
ingly remain tainted by controversy and scepticism. In recent years, biotechnology
has raised fresh ethical concerns in equipping humankind with the tools to alter life
itself by tinkering with the building blocks of living tissue — the genes contained
in the DNA of living organisms.5
Inventors and innovators often seek legal protection for their inventions, so
that they may lawfully exploit the fruits of their research to the exclusion of their
competitors.6 Modern patent law provides inventors with the right to exploit their
1 See WR Cornish, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied
Rights, 4th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999) at 218, who notes that biotechnol-
ogy promises many advantages in the cultivation of foodstuff and other natural prod-
ucts, and in combatting illness and generic disorders in humans and animals [Intellec-
tual Property].
2 See Industry Canada, “Generic Arguments About Patenting Higher Life Forms”, on-
line: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ippd-dppi.nsf/eng/ip00039.html>. In addition, resis-
tance to disease and pests are benefits that are often attributed to genetic engineering.
See Iain EP Taylor, “Genetic Engineering of Crops: Science Meets Civil Society’s Re-
sponse”, in Iain EP Taylor, ed, Genetically Engineered Crops: Interim Policies, Uncer-
tain Legislation (Binghamton, NY: Haworth Press, 2007) at xxvi [Genetically Engi-
neered Crops].
3 See Steven P McGiffen, Biotechnology: Corporate Power versus the Public Interest
(London and Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2005) at 198 [Biotechnology].
4 See McGiffen, ibid at 199, who describes a “juggernaut of corporate-controlled bio-
technology” moving and crushing all that stands in its way.
5 DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid, is an acid that carries genetic information in a living
cell, and that controls the development of the qualities that have been passed on to a
living thing from its parents. See Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, 3rd
ed (Essex: Longman Group, 1995) at 395 and 587.
6 Section 42 of the Patent Act, RSC, 1985, c P-4, which defines a patent grant as “the
exclusive right, privilege and liberty of making, constructing and using the invention
and selling it to others to be used, subject to adjudication in respect thereof before any
court of competent jurisdiction”.
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invention in the marketplace for a statutorily defined period of time7 in exchange
for mandatory disclosure of the patent claim and specifications. However, the ex-
tent to which patent law should protect genetically altered life forms remains, to
this day, a subject of controversy.8 A chief concern that has often been raised in
relation to the patent protection of genetically modified organisms is that life is
essentially a product of nature, and that it is unethical to grant legal or property
rights in respect of life forms.9 The idea that patent or property rights may be
granted in respect of living organisms or living tissue may be anathema to the view
that life is either sacrosanct (from a religious or humanitarian perspective) or a
product of nature (from the perspective of legal interpretation).10
Other objections raised against the patenting of modified life forms include the
environmental hazards of genetic engineering,11 the disruption of the natural order,
hazards to human health and biodiversity, the expropriation of traditional knowl-
edge,12 as well as the contamination of the world’s food supply.13 In this vein, one
might be tempted to characterise genetically altered life forms as the “forbidden
fruit” of biotechnology research — with the potential to yield substantial profits,
and yet fraught with controversy. Interesting parallels exist between discovering the
key to the building blocks of life, and the tree of knowledge, bearing the “forbidden
fruit” in the Biblical account of the Garden of Eden. Despite the ethical objections
7 See for instance section 44 of Canada’s Patent Act, which defines the patent term as
twenty years from the filing date.
8 The scope of patent protection that should be afforded to genetically modified life
forms is a subject of contention that has produced a “line of cleavage” among members
of Canada’s top court. The two most recent judgments by the Supreme Court of Can-
ada on the patentability of life forms were characterised by split decisions. See
Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 SCR 45 [Harvard
College] (with a 5 to 4 split in the decision) and Monsanto Canada Inc v Schmeiser,
[2004] 1 SCR 902 [Schmeiser] (again with a 5 to 4 split in the decision).
9 See for instance Stephanie Chong, “The Relevancy of Ethical Concerns in the Patent-
ing of Life Forms” (1993) 10 CIPR 189; Danish Council of Ethics, Patenting Human
Genes: A Report (Copenhagen: Danish Council of Ethics, 1994).
10 Mark W Lauroesch, “Genetic Engineering: Innovation and Risk Minimization” (1988)
57 Geo Wash L Rev 100 at 114, who suggests that such patents might “degrade the
sanctity of life and result in extensive and inhumane animal experimentation.” See also
Robert P Merges, “Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System and
Controversial Technologies” (1988) 47 Md L Rev 1051 at 1059-60, who observes that
the ownership of life may be considered a form of “secular sacrilege”.
11 Michael W Fox, Killer Foods: When Scientists Manipulate Genes, Better is Not Always
Best (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 1999) at 29, who notes that genetic traits in crops can
be transmitted to weeds, and pests like the diamondback moth caterpillar can develop
resistance to toxin-producing genetically modified crop plants. See also Miguel A Al-
tieri, “Transgenic Crops, Agrobiodiversity, and Agroecosystem Function”, in Taylor,
ed, Genetically Engineered Crops, supra note 2 at 46.
12 Burton T Ong, “Patenting the Biological Bounty of Nature: Re-examining the Status of
Organic Inventions as Patentable Subject Matter” (2004) 8 Marq Intell Prop L Rev 1 at
2 [Biological Bounty].
13 McGiffen, supra note 3 at 188.
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to genetic engineering, the United States and the European Union have started to
award and recognise patent rights in respect of modified living organisms, as dis-
cussed in Section II below.
This paper does not seek to express a detailed view on the ethical or moral
sustainability of awarding patents in respect of genetically modified life forms.14
Rather, its goal is to critically evaluate the extent to which transgenic life forms are
considered “patentable subject matter” in Canada, and to compare Canada’s ap-
proach with patent trends in other developed countries. It will begin with an analy-
sis of the groundbreaking case of Harvard College v Canada, in which the Su-
preme Court of Canada famously denied patent protection for a genetically altered
laboratory mouse. It will then consider the qualifying effect of a subsequent deci-
sion by the same court in Monsanto v Schmeiser on the rule in Harvard College.
The ruling in Schmeiser and its impact on Canadian patent law have been dis-
cussed at some length by other commentators,15 and the view that Schmeiser is
generally more favourable to patentees in the life sciences industry is not, of
course, a new observation. This paper seeks to add to the existing literature by
considering the impact of Schmeiser on the compatibility of Canadian biotechnol-
ogy law with international patent trends. Despite semantic differences in the defini-
tion of the phrase “patentable life form”, the Supreme Court of Canada has substan-
tially aligned Canada’s patent law on biotechnological inventions with that of the
United States and the European Union, by opening the door to the protection of life
forms with genetically modified components. Although genetically modified life
forms per se remain unpatentable in Canada, the Schmeiser decision appears to
allow inventors to obtain de facto equivalent protection over life forms by framing
the scope of their patent claim as being limited to the genetically modified cells or
genes within a living organism. The Schmeiser ruling supports the proposition that
using, breeding or cultivating a living organism containing patented cells or genes
amounts to an infringement of the patent.16 The impact of the Schmeiser decision
on Canadian patent law is that it has resulted in the de facto, but not de jure, aboli-
tion of the prohibition against patenting life forms in Canada.
This article concludes with some recommendations for patent law in Canada.
It proposes that the artificial complexities inherent in the Schmeiser decision can be
avoided by taking a clear stand on the patentability of genetically modified life
forms. By extending patent protection to genetically modified “components” of liv-
ing organisms, the Supreme Court of Canada has effectively already opened the
door to the patenting of “life”. As such, Canada should jettison the somewhat artifi-
cial distinction that it continues to maintain between genetically modified “compo-
nents” and genetically modified “life forms”. Although Canada does not currently
14 For a general discussion of why animals should not be excluded from patent protection
on ethical or economic grounds, see Robert P Merges, “Intellectual Property in Higher
Life Forms”, supra note 10.
15 See generally Bruce Ziff, “Travels with my Plant: Monsanto v Schmeiser revisited”
(2005) 2:2 UOLTJ 493; Andrew W Torrance, “Metaphysics and Patenting Life” (2007)
76 UMKC L Rev 363; Keith Aoki, “Seeds of Dispute: Intellectual Property Rights and
Agricultural Biodiversity” (2009) 3 Golden Gate U Envtl LJ 79.
16 See the discussion of Monsanto v Schmeiser, under Part I, infra.
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have a formal legal obligation under international law to expand the scope of its
patent protection for genetically modified organisms, an explicit recognition of life
forms as patentable subject matter would make Canada a more attractive destina-
tion for biotechnology investment, and allow it to play a more active role in trade
agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
I. ARE LIFE FORMS PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER IN
CANADA?
As one of the three major branches of intellectual property, patent law seeks to
reward innovation and creativity by granting a bundle of exclusive rights in respect
of inventions that meet the requirements of patentability under legislation. An “in-
vention” is defined in section 2 of Canada’s Patent Act as any “new and useful art,
process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new or useful im-
provement in any art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter”. In
contrast, mere scientific principles and abstract theorems have been expressly ex-
cluded from the scope of patentability.17 Hence the formula E=mc2 would not be
patentable on its own, but a nuclear reactor that is designed on the basis on this
formula might.18 In addition, a claimed invention must satisfy other requirements
for patentability including novelty19 and non-obviousness.20 In exchange for a
“limited monopoly” to use, exploit and sell the invention for a twenty year period,
the patent applicant is required to correctly and fully describe the operation of the
invention such that a person skilled in the relevant art or science would be able to
make, construct, compound or use the invention.21 This requirement of disclosure
is designed to enable the patented invention to eventually enter into the public do-
main after the patent term expires, so that the technology inherent to the invention
can then be added to the common pool of knowledge available to research commu-
nities, scientists, and the general public.
The technology neutral formulation of “invention” suggests that the Patent Act
does not discriminate between fields of technology where patentability is con-
cerned. It is also important to note that Canada’s Patent Act does not contain an
ordre public bar to patentability, unlike the European Union.22 However, the emer-
gence of the life sciences industry and biotechnology research has challenged ex-
isting conceptions of what constitutes an “invention”. The Supreme Court of Can-
17 Section 27(8) of the Patent Act, supra note 6.
18 Norman Siebrasse, “Comment on Monsanto Canada Inc v Schmeiser”, online:
<http://law.unb.ca/Siebrasse/Download/Schmeiser%20Comment.pdf> at 7.
19 See section 28.2(1) of the Patent Act on the requirement that the subject matter of
invention not be previously disclosed.
20 See section 28.3 of the Patent Act: The invention must not be “obvious” to a person
skilled in the art or science to which the invention pertains.
21 Section 27(3) Patent Act, supra note 6.
22 See Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention: “European patents shall not be
granted in respect of inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be con-
trary to “ordre public” or morality; such exploitation shall not be deemed to be so
contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the
Contracting States”.
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ada has had to grapple with the interpretation of this word in the context of whether
life forms can be considered patentable subject matter, and its interpretive attempts
have produced some interesting, though perhaps inconsistent, decisions in the field
of biotechnology law.
A traditional argument that has been raised against the patenting of life is that
living organisms are capable of natural reproduction, without the need for human
intervention.23 A naturally occurring life form is therefore ineligible for patent pro-
tection, because it is a product of nature and not the result of human ingenuity. On
the other hand, genetically modified organisms are not naturally occurring, and yet
may be capable of reproduction without human intervention. The potential for re-
production through natural means has not, however, prevented courts from confer-
ring patent protection on at least some types of life forms. It is a well-established
principle of law in Canada and the United States that lower life forms, such as
bacteria and other micro-organisms, can be patented, provided the requirements are
satisfied.24 There is authority, not just in the United States and Canada but also in
the United Kingdom, which extends patent protection to genetically altered micro-
organisms and processes involving micro-organisms.25
Biotechnology law in Canada reached a turning point in 2002, when the Su-
preme Court of Canada rejected a product patent claim in respect of a genetically
engineered higher life form — a transgenic laboratory mouse. The claimed inven-
tion in question involved injecting a cancer-promoting gene (or “oncogene”) into a
fertilized mouse egg, and then implanting the egg into a female host mouse.26 The
genetically modified gene would cause some of the host mouse’s offspring to de-
velop certain forms of cancer. The “infected” line of mice carrying the oncogene
could then be used in animal carcinogenic studies and to facilitate cancer research
in laboratories.27 The patent applicant (Harvard College) sought protection for both
the process used to produce the genetically altered mice, as well as the end product
of the process (the modified mice themselves). While a process patent would grant
the applicant a monopoly over the use of the described method to implant an
oncogene (and therefore the right to prevent others from using the same method to
produce genetically altered mice or other onco-animals), a product patent over the
mouse, on the other hand, would allow the patentee to prevent others from produc-
23 See for instance the dictum of Lamer J in the case of Pioneer Hi-Bred Ltd v Canada
(Commissioner of Patents), [1989] 1 SCR 1623 at 1634: “The courts have regarded
creations following the laws of nature as being mere discoveries the existence of which
man has simply uncovered without thereby being able to claim he has invented them.”
24 See for instance Abitibi Co, Re (1982), 62 CPR (2d) 81 (Can Pat App Bd & Pat
Commr); Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 US 303 (1980) [Chakrabarty].
25 See WR Cornish, Intellectual Property, supra note 1 at 217, who notes that there has
never been a general embargo in Britain on patents involving living matter. In as early
as the 1970s, the patentability of production techniques for pharmaceuticals which de-
pended upon the use of micro-organisms was accepted with little argument, as seen in
decisions like American Cyanamid Co v Berk Pharmaceuticals Ltd, [1976] RPC 231
(Eng Ch Div).
26 See Harvard College, supra note 8 at 7 and 122.
27 Ibid at 121.
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ing more mice by purchasing and then breeding them.28 A product patent, generally
viewed as a “higher order” variety of patent grants, would enable the patentee to
exclude others from making, using, offering to sell, importing or selling a product
that embodies the claimed invention, even if the product were developed indepen-
dently or used for a purpose not contemplated by the original product patentee.29
Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Canada, by a narrow majority, upheld the
validity of the process claim, while denying the product claim over the mouse it-
self. In delivering the majority decision of the court, Bastarache J held that a higher
life form is not patentable subject matter because it does not constitute a “manufac-
ture” or a “composition of matter” under section 2 of the Patent Act.30 The effect of
this majority judgment is that the applicant’s laboratory techniques of producing a
genetically modified mouse egg through the injection of an oncogene, as claimed in
the invention, was indeed eligible for patent protection, but the monopoly granted
by such a process patent would not prevent a third party from buying and then
breeding the product (the oncomouse) itself.31 Bastarache J, writing on behalf of
the majority, also expressed the view that the Patent Act in its current form was not
well suited to address the unique characteristics displayed by life forms, and sug-
gested that issues of such complexity mandated “intricate legal drafting” and a
careful balancing of competing interests to be undertaken by Parliament. Bas-
tarache J emphasised that the court lacked the “institutional competence” necessary
to engage in such an exercise.32
The extremely narrow margin that split the court in Harvard College was not
the only noteworthy aspect of the case. The forceful dissent expressed by Binnie J
in the same case is also instructive in shedding light on some of the complex policy
28 See George Wei Sze Shun, “Mus Musculus and Homo Sapiens: Murine Metaphysics
and the Canadian Supreme Court” (2003) Sing JLS 38 at 41.
29 Ong, Biological Bounty, supra note 12 at 30. Ong does note, however, that certain
types of process patent, such as a patent on a method of modifying the genetic makeup
of living mammals, may enable a process patentee to “lock” a field of technology and
shut out further innovation by other researchers unless a licence is first obtained. In
such circumstances, even process patents may confer a wide scope of monopoly on the
patentee. See also Margaret J Lane, “Patenting Life: Responses of the Patent Offices in
the U.S. and Abroad” (1991) 32 Jurimetrics J 89 at 91.
30 See Harvard College, supra note 8 at 120. See also Wei, supra note 28 at 47 and 49-
50, who notes that the majority judges in the Supreme Court based their decision prin-
cipally on statutory interpretation, in ruling that Harvard College’s product claims fell
outside the scope of patentable subject matter in section 2 of the Patent Act. He con-
trasts the Canadian approach with the US Supreme Court’s broad and flexible approach
to “manufacture” and “composition of matter” under the US Patent Act in Diamond v
Chakrabarty.
31 One commentator has suggested that only process patents should be made available in
respect to organic inventions because they better reflect what the scientist deserves for
his or her inventive efforts. See Ong, Biological Bounty, supra note 12 at 8 and 59.
According to this author, the practice of limiting such patent grants to process patents
would be commensurate with the inventor’s actual contributions to his or her commu-
nity, thereby conveying an attitude of respect for “the largess of nature’s handiwork”.
32 Harvard College, supra note 8 at 183.
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issues that the court had to grapple with. Binnie J noted that the Patent Act does not
expressly distinguish between higher life forms and lower life forms.33 In addition,
there was nothing unique or distinctive about Canada’s patent legislation that set it
apart from that of other major industrialized countries, like the United States.34
Binnie J expressed the concern that Canada’s failure to harmonize its patent prac-
tices with those of other developed countries might have an adverse impact on bio-
technology investment.35 Further, the phrase “composition of matter” was broad
enough to encompass patents on higher life forms and should be interpreted thus.
Binnie J emphasized that the existence of separate legislation on plant breeders’
rights should not be taken to mean that higher animal life forms are statutorily ex-
cluded from patentability.36 Given that plant breeders’ rights are narrower than pat-
ent rights and are governed by an entirely different regime, there is no express
legislative bar in the Patent Act that specifically excludes plants (or animals, for
that matter) from patent protection.
The majority decision by the Supreme Court in Harvard College appears to
have adopted a fairly conservative, and perhaps even rigid, interpretation of “com-
position of matter”, since living tissue consisting of cells and genes, is, scientifi-
cally speaking, made up of molecules and atoms. One commentator has gone to the
extent of describing the majority decision as not only “strikingly different” from
that in the European Union and the United States,37 but also “pre-scientific”,38
“metaphysical”39 and “having no basis in science”.40 While Bastarache J, in deliv-
ering the opinion of the majority, acknowledged that life forms contain “matter”, he
was also quick to note that life “transcends” matter and cannot be “created” or
“assembled” from scratch by human hands in a laboratory.41 Yet patent law does in
many circumstances afford protection to inventions that are formed by combining
different components together in a novel and ingenious way. There is arguably
nothing inherent in the phrase “composition of matter” that necessarily leads to the
exclusion of life forms from the category of “patentable subject matter”.
One possible policy consideration that could have implicitly informed the ma-
jority’s interpretation of “composition of matter” in section 2 of the Patent Act is
the ethical objection against conferring proprietary rights over life. The “com-
modification” of life as a form of protectable property right is troubling from a
moral standpoint because it seeks to grant control over the exploitation and use of
organisms that can replicate naturally, and might, depending on the species, be ca-
pable of movement and sentient thought, including the ability to feel pain and dis-
33 Ibid at 47.
34 Ibid at 3: “The truth is that our legislation is not unique.”
35 Ibid at 18, where Binnie J notes that the “massive investment of the private sector in
biotechnology research” is exactly the sort of research and innovation that the Patent
Act was intended to promote.
36 Ibid at 60-61.
37 See Torrance, supra note 15 at 368.
38 Ibid at 365.
39 Ibid at 401.
40 Ibid at 402.
41 Harvard College, supra note 8 at para 163.
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tress.42 Such ethical and moral objections to patent protection might theoretically
be accommodated under an “ordre public” bar to patentability, which prescribes
that certain classes of invention are not to be granted patent protection — on
grounds of public order, safety, morality or environmental concerns — even if they
satisfy the traditional requirements for patentability. The TRIPS Agreement and the
European Patent Convention allow for such exclusions on ordre public grounds.
However, Canada does not have an express ordre public provision in its patent
legislation. Although mathematical formulas and abstract theorems are excluded
from patentability under section 27(8) of the Patent Act, there is no specific in-built
“moral or ethical category” for the exclusion of Canadian inventions that are
deemed objectionable or undesirable. The judges for the majority in Harvard Col-
lege could therefore have felt it necessary to express their objections to the patent-
ing of life via the interpretation of “composition of matter” in section 2, given the
absence of an ordre public provision.
The issue of patenting life again arose for consideration in a subsequent case
on agricultural biotechnology that drew worldwide attention. In Monsanto v
Schmeiser,43 the Supreme Court was faced with the task of determining the validity
of a patent for genetically modified canola plant cells and genes with increased
tolerance for glyphosate herbicides (such as “Roundup”). The case concerned a
farmer, Percy Schmeiser, who grew the genetically modified strain of canola on his
agricultural land without obtaining permission or a licence from the patent owner.
Many of the farmers in the area had already switched to “Roundup Ready” canola
and were paying a licence fee to use the patented invention. These farmers were
also required to sign a “Technology Use Agreement” with Monsanto which forbade
them from saving the seeds for replanting or inventory, selling or giving the seeds
away, and placed restrictions on the commercial purchasers to whom the harvested
crop could be sold.
Interestingly, the Court reiterated its earlier holding in Harvard College that
higher life forms are not patentable. However, since the patent claim in the
Schmeiser case was for the genetically modified cells and genes, and not for the
canola plant as a whole, the validity of Monsanto’s patent was upheld. The court
noted that the modified gene that made the plant resistant to herbicides was “chi-
meric”,44 and did not exist in nature. In addition, Mr. Schmeiser had infringed this
patent by “using” the invention in planting, harvesting and collecting the geneti-
cally modified crop and seeds. Nevertheless, the court held that despite the finding
of infringement, Mr. Schmeiser was not liable to account for any profits, since his
profits were not causally attributable to the patented properties of his crop.45 The
42 Michael Saunders, “Creating Life from Scratch: The Patentability of Synthetic Orga-
nisms” (2008) 11 Tul J Tech & Intell Prop 75 at 88.
43 Schmeiser, supra note 8.
44 Ibid at 20.
45 Ibid at 100–105. Monsanto was required to choose between two alternative remedies:
damages or an accounting of profits. In light of the fact that Monsanto had elected to
seek an accounting of profits from Mr. Schmeiser, it was not entitled to damages. As
noted in the majority opinion of the court, an accounting of profits is based on the
profits made by the patent infringer, rather than the amount lost by the inventor.
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profits that Mr. Schmeiser had made were identical to what he would have made
had he grown ordinary canola.46
The Supreme Court’s decision in Schmeiser has inspired some rather interest-
ing commentary from intellectual property scholars in Canada. Torrance observes
that while Schmeiser did not expressly overrule Harvard College, it did vitiate the
latter’s effect, by establishing the “de facto” patenting of life forms in Canada.47 In
addition, Siebrasse notes that the difference in scope between the Harvard mouse
patent claim (which extended to the life form itself) and the Monsanto patent
(which limited its scope to the modified cells and genes) might seem like one of
form rather than substance, but the consequences are dramatic.48 He observes that a
patent for the cells of a higher life form will now give effectively the same protec-
tion as a patent for the life form itself. Ziff observes that a patented gene contained
in every cell of a plant confers a form of property right over the entire plant.49 In
the same vein, Gervais and Judge surmise that since a patent can now be infringed
by using a higher life form in which a protected invention is embedded, the contrast
in scope between the Harvard mouse claim and the Monsanto claim may, for prac-
tical purposes, be a “distinction without a difference”.50
The Supreme Court’s holding that a patent for genetically modified cells can
now confer rights of exclusivity over the use of an entire life form significantly
weakens the rule against patenting life laid down in Harvard College. Yet Gervais
and Judge emphasize that Schmeiser is not a reversal of Harvard College, since the
rule that higher life forms are unpatentable per se continues to hold. Interestingly,
Siebrasse applauds the majority approach in Schmeiser as being compatible with
the “broad principles” of patent law, reflective of an intention, by the majority
judges, not to be restrained by the rigid technicalities of the Harvard College
case.51 However, the expansive approach taken by the court vis-à-vis the question
of infringement essentially renders nugatory the legal distinction between a patent
claim for a genetically modified life form and one that is limited specifically to an
“embedded invention” within that life form. The court’s insistence in drawing a
distinction between these two categories of patent claim introduces an element of
artificial complexity, and perhaps even an unjustifiable double standard, into the
realm of Canadian biotechnology law.52 The result of the Schmeiser litigation
46 Ibid at 104.
47 Torrance, supra note 15 at 369-370.
48 See Norman Siebrasse, “Comment on Monsanto Canada Inc v Schmeiser”, supra note
8 at 2.
49 See Bruce Ziff, “Travels with my Plant: Monsanto v Schmeiser revisited”, supra note
15 at 505.
50 Daniel Gervais & Elizabeth F Judge, Intellectual Property: The Law in Canada, 2nd
edition (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) [Gervais & Judge] at 701.
51 See Siebrasse, supra note 18 at 3: “The majority in Schmeiser chose consistency with
broad principles of patent law at the expense of practical consistency with the Harvard
Mouse decision, while the dissent chose consistency with Harvard Mouse at the ex-
pense of patent principles.”
52 In this vein, Wei suggests that it may be more appropriate to recognize special excep-
tions to patent rights to allow for agriculture, plant breeders’ rights, research and inno-
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might very well be an implicit recognition that Harvard College could easily have
obtained the same level of protection for a product patent in Canada as in the
United States if they had only framed their patent claim to cover the genetically
modified cancer gene, rather than the entire oncomouse itself.53
Since the conclusion of the Schmeiser litigation, and release of the Supreme
Court decision, the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) has sought to
clarify the scope of patentable subject matter for claims involving genetically modi-
fied components of animal life forms. In a 2006 “Practice Notice”, the CIPO an-
nounced that animals at any stage of development, from fertilized eggs onwards
(including totipotent stem cells which have the potential to develop into an entire
animal), are not patentable under section 2 of the Patent Act.54 This directive is
arguably inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Harvard College that a
fertilized genetically modified mouse egg is patentable subject matter.55 Neverthe-
less, the CIPO Practice Notice also indicates that genetically modified cells that do
not have the potential to develop into entire animals are patentable.56
Hence, under the Practice Notice, a modified cancer gene or cell would still be
patentable in Canada, as long as it meets the statutory requirements in the Patent
Act. In addition, the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee (CBAC) has
recommended that patents should be allowed in respect of plants and non-human
animals that meet the requirements of novelty, non-obviousness and utility, but not
on any part of the human body.57 Although the CBAC’s recommendation is not
binding on Canadian courts, it is consistent with the general trend in other devel-
oped countries to extend patent protection to genetically modified life forms.
Although the CIPO Practice Notice seeks to draw a firm line between “ani-
mals at any stage of development”, and “genetically modified cells that do not have
the potential to develop into entire animals” for the purpose of patentability, this
distinction may be a cosmetic one in the case of inventions involving non-totipotent
cells, given the Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of “infringement” in the
Schmeiser decision. The practical effect that this Notice would have on the drafting
cent bystanders, instead of rejecting patent applications strictly on grounds of scope.
See Wei, supra note 28 at 77-78.
53 See for instance Keith Aoki, “Seeds of Dispute”, supra note 15 at 104, who observes
that living inventions are now patentable in Canada as long as they are not expressed as
a higher life form.
54 See Canadian Intellectual Property Office, “Office Practice Regarding Fertilized Eggs,
Stem Cells, Organs and Tissues”, online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-in-
ternetopic.nsf/eng/wr00295.html>. See also Gervais & Judge, supra note 50 at 702.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid. Such cells would include embryonic, multipotent and pluripotent stem cells. See
Canadian Intellectual Property Office, “Office Practice Regarding Fertilized Eggs,
Stem Cells, Organs and Tissues”, online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-
internetopic.nsf/eng/wr00295.html>.
57 Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee, “Patenting of Higher Life Forms and
Related Issues: Report to the Government of Canada Biotechnology Ministerial Coor-
dinating Committee”, online: <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/C2-598-
2001-2E.pdf>. See also Torrance, supra note 15 at 369 and Wei, supra note 28 at 76.
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of patent claims is that patent filers seeking protection for genetically modified ani-
mals are now encouraged to frame their invention as a “non-totipotent” cellular or
genetic “component” of a life form, as was done in the Monsanto patent, and not as
the organism itself, in order to be eligible for patent consideration. Nevertheless, if
one were to extend the ruling in Monsanto to animals, the interpretation of “use”
adopted by the Supreme Court would grant a successful patent applicant de facto
control over the entire organism, since breeding and selling modified animals con-
taining patented genes would essentially constitute patent infringement.
The corollary of the analysis above is that Canada has aligned itself in sub-
stance (though not in form) with the patent practices of other developed nations in
extending patent rights to inventors of genetically modified organisms. Notwith-
standing the Supreme Court’s decision in Harvard College, there had been evi-
dence of growing policy support for extending patent protection to plants and ani-
mals prior to December 2002. As mentioned earlier, the Canadian Biotechnology
Advisory Committee issued a recommendation in June of 2002 that higher life
forms that meet the criteria be treated as patentable.58 Although there continues to
be a formal distinction in Canadian law between the patentability of genetically
modified cells and the exclusion of life forms per se from the scope of protection, a
patent awarded for genetically modified cells confers substantially the same rights
as a patent for a genetically modified organism carrying those cells. The next sec-
tion explores the extent to which this “emerging trend” in Canada comports with
general patent practices in other parts of the developed world, and seeks to identify
a growing consensus, particularly among developed countries, in favour of treating
some forms of genetically modified life as patentable subject matter.
II. PATENT LAW IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE: IS
“LIFE” PATENTABLE?
In this section, I discuss the scope of protection patent protection afforded to
life forms under United States legislation and the European Patent Convention, and
examine the extent to which these patent standards are compatible with the legal
position in Canada. Through this comparison, I seek to identify a high degree of
consensus in favour of recognizing lower life forms as patentable subject matter,
and the early signs of an emerging consensus, among these developed nations, that
such protection should be extended to multi-cellular organisms.
(a) The United States
The United States has a fairly long and established history of recognizing pat-
ent protection for non-naturally existing living organisms, which dates back to as
early as 1980, when the Supreme Court of the United States held, in Diamond v
58 See Recommendation 2 of Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee, “Patenting
of Higher Life Forms and Related Issues: Report to the Government of Canada Bio-
technology Ministerial Coordinating Committee”, online:
<http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/C2-598-2001-2E.pdf>, which pro-
vides, inter alia: “We recommend that higher life forms (i.e., plants, seeds and non-
human animals) that meet the criteria of novelty, non-obviousness and utility be recog-
nized as patentable.” See also Torrance, supra note 15 at 369.
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Chakrabarty,59 that a live, human-made micro-organism was patentable subject
matter under §101, as a “manufacture” or “composition of matter” within 35 USC
on the patentability of inventions.60 §101 defines, in language very similar to that
contained in the Canadian Patent Act, a patentable invention or discovery as “any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof”. As is the case in Canada, there are no legis-
lative prohibitions in the United States on the types of subject matter that are pat-
entable based on moral or public policy grounds.61 The US Supreme Court in
Chakrabarty emphasized that the claimed invention — a genetically engineered
bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil — possessed properties not present
in naturally occurring bacteria — and was therefore a product of “human ingenu-
ity”, rather than the handiwork of nature.62 The US Supreme Court adopted a rela-
tively permissive approach to patentability, suggesting, in an oft-quoted line, that
“anything under the sun made by man” is patentable, borrowing from language
used in the Committee Reports accompanying the Patent Act of 1952.63 While the
broad language of §101 does not distinguish between living and non-living inven-
tions, it excludes the laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract ideas from
the scope of patentability.64 It is also noteworthy that §103 (b) (1) and (3) specifi-
cally indicate the circumstances under which a biotechnological process — includ-
ing the process of genetically altering a single- or multi-celled organism — can be
considered to “nonobvious” and eligible for patent protection.
It is interesting to note that although Diamond v Chakrabarty upheld the pat-
entability of a genetically modified micro-organism, the broad language used by
the Supreme Court in that case has opened the door in the United States for patents
in respect of genetically modified life forms in general, including multicellular or-
ganisms. It has been noted that patents on multicellular life forms are regularly
granted in the United States, building upon the precedent set by the Supreme Court
in Chakrabarty.65
The rule that genetically engineered microorganisms may enjoy patent protec-
tion is relatively uncontroversial, and has been accepted in many leading industrial-
ised nations, including Canada.66 However, it is important to note that the United
States was one of the first industrialized nations to extend patent protection to
higher, multi-cellular life forms, such as plants and animals. The United States pat-
ent for the Harvard oncomouse was granted as early as 1988.67 Patents on the
59 Chakrabarty, supra note 24.
60 Ibid at 308–318.
61 Gregory R Hagen & Sébastien A Gittens, “Patenting Part-Human Chimeras, Transgen-
ics and Stem Cells for Transplantation in the United States, Canada, and Europe”
(2008) 14 Rich JL & Tech 11 at 80.
62 Chakrabarty, supra note 24 at 308–318.
63 See Michael Saunders, supra note 42 at 78.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid at 79.
66 Ibid at 80, where Saunders notes that Canada, Germany, Australia and Japan have
granted patents for genetically engineered lower life forms or microorganisms.
67 Wei, supra note 28 at 43.
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oncomouse have also been granted in Europe, the United States and Japan.68
The patentability of transgenic animals in the United States was further rein-
forced when the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issued a no-
tice in 1987 indicating that non-naturally occurring, non human life forms, includ-
ing animals, were patentable subject matter under 35 USC 101.69
The analysis above indicates that the United States defines the scope of “pat-
entable subject matter” more broadly than Canada. Under the American paradigm
of patent protection for biotechnological inventions, genetically engineered life
forms — whether consisting of cells, genes, micro-organisms or multicellular orga-
nisms — are patentable, as long as they meet the requirements of novelty, nonobvi-
ousness and utility.70 However, human life forms are excluded from the scope of
patentability in the United States. It remains a question of some uncertainty as to
whether chimeric inventions71 containing some human genetic material can be pat-
ented.72 The relevance of this issue has become more apparent as new medical
technologies enable the insertion of human genetic material into animal organs to
facilitate transplantation. The possibility of patenting such “part human materials”
would depend on the biological criteria used by legislators and courts to determine
the level of human genetic content considered to be acceptable in a patented
invention.
While human beings are not patentable in and of themselves in the United
States, it appears that certain forms of isolated human elements, such as nucleotide
sequences, are generally available for patenting.73 Yet the maximum amount of
human material that can be contained in biotechnology inventions before they can
be patented is a question that has not been satisfactorily resolved. The United States
Patent and Trademark Office issued a notice in 1987 indicating that a claim which
is directed to or including within its scope a human being will not be considered to
be patentable subject matter under 35 USC 101.74 Hence the position in the United
States is that human beings at any stage of development are not patentable.75 This
68 Saunders, supra note 42 at 82.
69 See USPTO, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure §2105 (2007), online:
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/2100_2105.htm>; Hagen &
Gittens, supra note 61 at 46.
70 See 35 USC §103, especially §103(b)(1), which describes the conditions under which a
biological process resulting in a novel composition of matter may be considered
nonobvious.
71 A chimeric invention is one that contains genetic material from more than one species
of living organism. The term “chimeric” is in fact a reference to the “chimera” from
Greek mythology, a being with a lion’s head, a goat’s body and a serpent’s tail. See
Thomas A Magnani, “The Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras” (1999) 14 Berke-
ley Tech LJ 443 at 443; Ryan Hagglund, “Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras”
(2008-2009) 25 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech LJ 51 at 53.
72 Hagen & Gittens, supra note 61 at 85.
73 Ibid at 3.
74 See Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, “Animals — Patentability”, 1077 OG
24, 21 April 1987.
75 See Hagen & Gittens, supra note 61 at 57.
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leaves open the possibility that biological inventions that contain some human ge-
netic material, but which do not have the potential of developing into a human
being, such as a pig’s organ containing human DNA, may be patentable in the
United States. The line of cleavage between patentable and non-patentable bi-
otechnological inventions in the United States therefore distinguishes between
animal or plant life forms and human life forms. The presence of human genetic
material in a biotechnological invention that is capable of developing into a human
being would render an otherwise patentable invention ineligible for protection in
the United States.
(b) The European Union
The position in the European Union with respect to the patentability of geneti-
cally modified life forms is not dissimilar to that of the United States. Article 52(1)
of the European Patent Convention provides a definition of “patentable subject
matter”, and Rule 27 of the Convention’s Implementing Regulations sets out the
criteria for patenting biotechnological inventions, with Rule 27(b) extending the
patentability of inventions to “plants and animals” if the technical feasibility of the
invention is not limited to one single plant or animal variety. Although a European
patent for the Harvard Oncomouse was granted in 1992,76 it is important to note
that the European Patent Convention is a multilateral agreement containing mini-
mum standards, and that the individual patent practices of member states may differ
considerably. Rule 27(b) embodies a treaty norm, adopted by member states of the
European Union, in favour of recognising higher life forms as patentable subject
matter, although there are several notable exceptions pertaining to processes in-
volving humans, such as the prohibition of human cloning under Rule 28. How-
ever, unlike the United States and Canada, member states of the European Patent
Convention take into account ordre public considerations when determining issues
of patentability.77 The usefulness of the genetically engineered life form is weighed
against any suffering caused to the animal in what is known as a “balancing test”.78
As in the United States, it is not entirely clear whether part-human chimeras
are patentable under the European Patent Convention. In addition, questions of pat-
entability are compounded in the European Union by the jurisdictional complexi-
ties of the European patent system. Hagen and Gittens note that there is no such
thing as a “European Community patent” and that patents granted by the European
Patent Office (EPO) can be revoked under national law.79 However, the Biotech-
76 European Patent EP0169672; See also Saunders, supra note 42 at 80.
77 See Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention, which contains “ordre public”
exceptions to patentability on grounds of morality. See also Hagen & Gittens, supra
note 61 at 80.
78 Saunders, supra note 42 at 85. The European Patent Office has, however, recom-
mended that ordre public objections should be limited to “demonstrably abhorrent”
inventions. See also Wei, supra note 28 at 78.
79 Hagen & Gittens, supra note 61 at 82.
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nology Directive,80 which was incorporated into the European Patent Convention
in June 1999 by the Implementing Regulations to the EPC, provides that isolated
biological elements may be patentable, even if they are identical in structure to
their naturally occurring analogues.81 Interestingly, Rule 23(e)(1) of the EPC con-
tains an explicit prohibition against the patenting of human bodies at any stage of
development.82 There is also a ban on human cloning in the European Union.83
Unfortunately, the EPC and the Biotechnology Directive do not provide guidance
on the percentage of human genetic material that would be deemed acceptable in a
biological invention for the purpose of patentability. State practice among members
of the European Patent Convention in this regard varies somewhat — with Sweden
and Germany allowing patents for pluripotent stem cells, despite a contrary view
expressed by the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies
(EGE).84
The position vis-à-vis the patentability of life in the European patent system
reflects an interesting convergence with patent trends in the United States. Like the
US, patent norms in the European Union have extended protection to both unicellu-
lar and multicellular life forms,85 but with an explicit prohibition against the pat-
enting of human beings or human bodies. One significant difference, however, is
that while the European Patent Convention contains an ordre public exception, it
does not contain a specific list of inventions that are considered contrary to ordre
public.86 Some commentators have suggested replacing the prohibition against pat-
enting human bodies with that of patenting “persons”, so as to clarify the position
with respect to the patentability of part-human chimeras,87 which consist of inven-
tions combining human and animal genetic material.
The analysis above indicates that intellectual property laws in the United
States and the European Union have begun to recognize the patentability of higher
80 European Community Directive on Biotechnology (Directive 98/44/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Bi-
otechnological Inventions).
81 See Article 5(2) of the Biotechnology Directive.
82 Article 5(1) of the Biotechnology Directive also contains a similar prohibition against
the patenting of human bodies at any stage of development. See also Hagen & Gittens,
supra note 61 at 79.
83 See Rule 23(d) of the European Patent Convention; see also Saunders, supra note 42 at
87.
84 Hagen & Gittens, supra note 61 at 83.
85 See Torrance, supra note 15 at 368, who notes that the European Law is “permissive”,
allowing patent protection for both microorganisms and multicellular organisms
(“macroorganisms”).
86 Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention states that European patents shall not
be granted for inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to
“ordre public” or morality, but does not provide examples of what might be considered
“immoral”. Articles 53(b) and (c) do, however, proscribe patent protection for plant
and animal varieties, as well as certain methods of treatment for human beings and
animals.
87 Hagen & Gittens, supra note 61 at 33.
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life forms, extending protection far beyond genetically modified micro-orga-
nisms — the subject matter of protection in Diamond v Chakrabarty. One can ob-
serve the emergence of two patent norms relating to life forms — an older, more
established, and more widely recognised one for lower life forms such as bacteria
and microorganisms (dating back to Chakrabarty), and a newer, more recent one
for multicellular organisms, including plants and non-human animals. In the next
section, I explore the extent to which these two norms are beginning to find expres-
sion in multilateral agreements on trade and intellectual property.
Country / Patentable Not Patentable
Region
Canada Genetically modified micro- Higher life forms, including
organisms, cells and genes plants, animals and human
life forms
United States Genetically modified micro- Human life forms
organisms, cells, genes,
higher life forms
European Genetically modified micro- Human life forms
Union organisms, cells, genes,
higher life forms (subject to
“ordre public” and balancing
test)
III. PATENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW — THE
EMERGENCE OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW NORM
FOR THE PATENTABILITY OF HIGHER LIFE FORMS?
(a) International Treaty Norms relating to the Patent Protection of
Modified Life Forms
An interesting issue that arises for consideration at this juncture is the extent to
which international agreements on intellectual property mandate the protection of
modified life forms as patentable subject matter. One of the most important recent
developments in the field of international intellectual property law was the entry
into force of the TRIPS Agreement in 1995,88 upon the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The TRIPS Agreement im-
posed minimum standards of intellectual property protection on all member states
of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).89
Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement adopts a “technology neutral” approach
to “patentable subject matter”. Although it does not specifically mention geneti-
88 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade
in Counterfeit Goods, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 ILM 1197 (1994).
89 For example, Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement states that the term of patent protec-
tion shall not end before the expiration of twenty years from the filing date.
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cally modified life forms, it provides that “patents shall be available for any inven-
tions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided they are
new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application”. It also
stipulates, among other things, that patent rights are to be made available “without
discrimination” as to the field of technology.
The technology neutral thrust of Article 27.1 is perhaps somewhat attenuated
by the presence of Articles 27.2 and 27.3, which allow member states to exclude
inventions from patentability on ordre public or other specified grounds. Judging
from the plain text of Article 27.2, one might surmise that the norm against dis-
crimination as to the field of technology is not absolute, and that member states are
essentially free, within the limits prescribed by the section,90 to exclude certain
technologies or inventions from the scope of patentability. The Article specifically
mentions the protection of human, animal and plant life as a possible basis on
which to exclude an invention from patentability. A logical inference that can be
drawn from the text of Article 27 is that animals and plants are not categorically
excluded from patentability under the TRIPS Agreement, although member states
are generally free to pass laws excluding such inventions from patent protection.
Accordingly, there is no clear treaty norm in the Agreement which expressly sup-
ports the protection of modified plants or animals as a form of intellectual property.
Member states are given a considerable amount of discretion in the extent to which
they choose to extend patent protection to animals and plants. One commentator
has suggested that the TRIPS Agreement only implicitly recognizes the patentabil-
ity of whole organisms.91
Like the TRIPS Agreement, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)92 adopts a technology neutral approach to patentability. Article 1709.1,
in particular, states that each Party shall make patents available for any inventions
in “all fields of technology”, as long as the requirements of novelty, inventive step
and industrial application are satisfied. It is noteworthy that NAFTA mirrors the
structure of the patent provisions in the TRIPS Agreement in defining exceptions to
the patentability of inventions. Article 1709.2 of NAFTA allows a Party to exclude
inventions from patentability on grounds of ordre public or morality, while Article
1709.3 specifically allow exclusions for “plants and animals” other than microorga-
nisms. The treaty norms established in the patent sections of NAFTA clearly reflect
a bifurcated approach in the treatment of genetically modified life forms — a clear
standard requiring patent protection for microorganisms, and an optional require-
ment to extend protection to higher life forms. Based on an analysis of these textual
provisions, an argument might be made that the practice of awarding patents for
higher life forms has yet to be crystallized as a treaty norm in either the NAFTA or
the WTO treaty framework.93
90 Article 27.2 provides that the exclusion from patentability must not be made merely
because the exploitation of the invention is prohibited by law in the member state.
91 Torrance, supra note 15 at 365.
92 NAFTA, Can TS 1994 No 2.
93 See also Elisabeth A Abergel, “Trade, Science, and Canada’s Regulatory Framework
for Determining the Environmental Safety of GE Crops”, in Taylor, ed, Genetically
Modified Crops, supra note 2 at 194 who notes that the intellectual property rules
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On the subject of microorganisms, the Budapest Treaty on the International
Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure
implicitly recognises the patentability of life forms by establishing an international
system for the deposit of patented lower life forms. Article 3 of the Treaty, in par-
ticular, requires member states to recognize the deposit of such material at any in-
ternational depository authority.
The norm in favour of extending patent protection to microorganisms appears
to be more firmly entrenched in international treaty law (particularly in the text of
NAFTA) than that for higher life forms. This implicit distinction in the treatment of
organisms based on their classification as higher or lower life forms is similar to
the Canadian Supreme Court’s “bifurcated approach” in distinguishing between
patent applications for modified cells, on the one hand, and patent applications in
respect of living organisms in which those cells are embedded, on the other. This
dichotomy can perhaps be viewed more accurately as a distinction between unicel-
lular and multicellular inventions, although it has been pointed out that the line
between “higher” and “lower” life forms is not always clearly defined in scientific
or legal terms.94
Yet, it is also important to note that neither the Budapest Treaty nor the TRIPS
Agreement expressly mandates the patentability of lower life forms or microorga-
nisms. The Budapest Treaty merely establishes a system by which deposits of mi-
croorganisms are to be recognised by contracting parties which allow or require
such deposits for the purposes of patent procedure. As such, there is no express
treaty norm in the major patent law conventions, with the exception perhaps of
NAFTA, which specifically supports the protection of lower life forms as patenta-
ble inventions. The major international patent treaties appear to confer a significant
amount of discretion to contracting parties on the subject of what constitutes “pat-
entable subject matter”. While other international conventions and organizations,
such as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Di-
versity,95 the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Mea-
under the World Trade Organization stipulate that members may exempt plants and
animals from the scope of patentability.
94 See Torrance, supra note 15 at 385, who discusses whether there is a basis, in Canadian
patent law, for making a distinction between higher and lower life forms, particularly
since the Canadian Patent Act does not discriminate between “more complex” and
“less complex” subject matter. Interestingly, Bastarache J, in delivering the majority
opinion in Harvard College, has noted that the distinction between higher and lower
life forms is widely accepted as valid and is defensible based on the “common sense
differences” between the two. See Harvard College, supra note 8 at 199 and 205.
95 Articles 10.6 and 11.8 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety allude to the “precau-
tionary principle” in international environmental law in allowing countries to deny im-
ports of genetically modified organisms and food products on account of risks to
human health. See also Katherine Barrett & Conrad G Brunk, “A Precautionary Frame-
work for Biotechnology” in Taylor, ed, Genetically Modified Crops, supra note 2 at
134. The full text of the Protocol can be viewed online:
<http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/text/>.
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sures (the SPS Agreement) of the World Trade Organization,96 and the Codex Ali-
mentarius Commission97 lay down rules on trade in modified organisms, they do
not provide guidance on their patentability as inventions.
Given the lack of an express treaty norm mandating the patent protection of
genetically modified life forms, the practice in the United States of conferring such
protection can be said to be a voluntary “ratcheting up” of domestic patent stan-
dards to a level beyond that required by its treaty obligations. The convergent pat-
ent practices in the United States and the European Union of protecting modified
multicellular life forms as patentable inventions can therefore be said to be compat-
ible with, but not mandated by, their obligations under international law.
It should nevertheless be borne in mind that these convergent trends are
largely confined to developed states in North America and Europe. There is evi-
dence to suggest that at least some developing countries and emerging economic
powers are reluctant to accept higher life forms as patentable subject matter.98 In
India, for instance, higher life forms are specifically excluded from the scope of
patentable subject matter.99 In addition, Bolivia submitted a paper at a meeting of
the WTO TRIPS Council in 2011 arguing that Art 27.3(b) needs to be amended to
prohibit the patenting of life forms and parts thereof.100 Among the arguments
96 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, online:
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15sps_01_e.htm>.
97 See Codex Alimentarius, online: <http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/index_
en.jsp>.
98 In a discussion paper on the review of Article 27.3 (b) of the TRIPS Agreement in
1999, India submitted that it was unprepared to accept any further strengthening of the
protection provided to life forms before assessing, by experience, what standard would
be appropriate for Indian society. The paper noted that “developing country laws” in
the area of biotechnology were still being developed and that it would take some time
for developing countries to acquire experience on the “level of protection necessary
and desirable as well as the exceptions and balances necessary for ethical, social and
economic needs of their peoples”. In addition, the paper proposed excluding patent
protection for life forms from national laws till the required experience had been ac-
quired. See Someshwar Singh, “Patents on Life Forms Should be Re-examined, Says
India”, online: <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/lifeform-cn.htm>.
99 Section 3(j) of India’s Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005 excludes from patentability
“plants and animals in whole or any part thereof other than micro-organisms but in-
cluding seeds, varieties and species and essentially biological processes for production
or propagation of plants and animals”. The above provision was added to the Act via
amendments in 2002 to codify into Indian law the TRIPS-permitted exclusion from
patentability of “plants and animals” other than microorganisms and specified biologi-
cal processes. However, since January 2005, when the TRIPS transitional period in
respect of pharmaceutical patents ran out for developing countries, India has granted a
handful of pharmaceutical product patents. One commentator has suggested that In-
dia’s burgeoning domestic pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry is beginning to
invent rather than merely reverse-engineer. See Janice M Mueller, “The Tiger Awak-
ens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent System and the Rise of Indian
Pharmaceutical Innovation” (2007) 68 U Pitt L Rev 491 at 496-8 and 559.
100 See Third World Network Information Service on Intellectual Property Issues, “Bolivia
submits detailed paper on TRIPS Article 27.3(b)”, 10 March 2011, online:
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raised by Bolivia in its written submissions are that patent ownership of life raises
serious ethical and moral concerns, is anathema to the sacred conception of life
held by indigenous peoples in developing countries, facilitates biopiracy by con-
doning the appropriation by large multinational corporations of traditional knowl-
edge developed by indigenous communities for centuries, grants monopolistic con-
trol to such corporations over key industries such as health, food and agriculture,
and allows them to restrict access to essential treatments and medicines. In the pa-
per, Bolivia expressed the view that the patenting of life poses a grave danger to
humanity and that amending the TRIPS Agreement to prohibit such patents should
be an essential part of the mandate of the Doha Development Round. In a similar
vein, Kenya and the Africa Group have expressed opposition to the patenting of life
at a seminar on “Current Developments in the WTO” organized in 2000 by the
Third World Network, raising the concern that the patenting of life forms might
have serious implications for food security in the developing world.101
Based on the above analysis, there is no uniform consensus, among members
of the international trading community that patent protection should be extended to
genetically modified life forms. Even Canada, a highly developed nation with a
fairly mature intellectual property system, is somewhat hesitant and qualified in its
acceptance of genetically modified inventions as patentable subject matter. This
can be deduced from Canada’s refusal to formally extend patent protection to
higher life forms, despite having shifted its policy stance favourably in recent years
toward such protection. Canada’s approach may be said to be entirely consistent
with its legal obligations, both nationally and internationally speaking, since noth-
ing in international patent law or domestic law specifically mandates extending pat-
ent protection to higher life forms. Furthermore, it might be observed that the
emerging state practice in the United States in regard to patenting higher life forms
are a result of perceived compliance with national law, rather than with an interna-
tional obligation. Without adequate evidence of favourable state practice in the
field of biotechnological patents for life forms in developing nations, it is difficult
to extrapolate any sign of sufficiently widespread support for an emerging norm in
favour of protecting higher life forms.
The evidence appears to be clearer, however, that there is greater support
among developed countries for the treatment of genetically modified lower life
forms as patentable subject matter. The treaty norm in favour of patent protection
for lower life forms is more clearly defined in both NAFTA and the European Pat-
ent Convention. In addition, the majority decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Harvard College observed that “it is now accepted in Canada that lower life
forms are patentable”.102 A stronger argument can therefore be made that the state
<http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/intellectual_property/info.service/2011/ipr.info.
110305.htm>.
101 See Martin Khor, “Why Life Forms Should Not Be Patented”, online:
<http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/2103.htm>.
102 See Harvard College, supra note 8, at 201. The majority judges did note, however, at
para 197, that Abitibi Co, Re, supra note 24 was in fact a Patent Appeal Board decision
and that the patentability of lower life forms “was in fact never litigated in Canada.”
They were quick to add, at para 201, that the accepted position with respect to the
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practice in these developed countries of extending patent protection to microorga-
nisms arises from a legal obligation that is grounded in precedent and regional
treaty provisions. A preliminary conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is
that normative evolution in respect of patenting lower life forms appears to be more
advanced than that for higher life forms, and the practice of awarding protection to
genetically modified microorganisms is closer to becoming crystallised as an inter-
national patent norm — subject, of course, to more widespread explicit acceptance
by other players in the international community, especially developing countries.
On the other hand, the patenting of higher life forms continues to be objected to
with more strongly-voiced ethical and moral concerns, rendering it a less likely
candidate for crystallization into international treaty law, at least in the foreseeable
future.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA — WHICH WAY FORWARD
FOR THE PROTECTION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED
LIFE FORMS?
While one might observe some degree of convergence in the patent practices
of developed countries, the patentability of modified life forms remains a question
of some controversy. As discussed in the previous section, the protection of modi-
fied higher life forms is not currently mandated by international conventions on
patent law. As a member of NAFTA, Canada is not obliged to extend patent protec-
tion to genetically modified plants or animals, as long as it invokes either the ordre
public provision or one of other exceptions for higher organisms contained in the
Agreement.
Quite interestingly, however, Canada’s Patent Act does not specifically men-
tion plants or animals, nor does it contain an ordre public exception. To further
compound matters, the Schmeiser legacy has left Canadian patent law in a state of
some uncertainty. The Schmeiser decision has opened the door to biotechnological
patents by recognising the patentability of genetically modified components of liv-
ing organisms, while denying protection for entire organisms. As mentioned earlier,
this distinction introduces an element of artificial complexity into the analysis of
patentability, since the effect of Schmeiser is to grant de facto protection over the
entire organism to a successful patentee with a valid claim in respect of genetically
modified genes or cells.
A more coherent approach for Canada would be to jettison the “halfway
house” or the “door half open” position represented in Schmeiser, and to either
recognize the patentability of genetically modified organisms outright, or to restrict
their protection to process patents, as at least one commentator has suggested.103
The first option would be more compatible with the current trends in the developed
world, and represent an explicit recognition of the more permissive and liberal ap-
proach adopted by Binnie J in his dissenting opinion in Harvard College. If, on the
other hand, the second option is chosen, the Patent Act should be modified to in-
patentability of lower life forms did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that higher
life forms were also patentable in Canada.
103 Ong, Biological Bounty, supra note 12 at 8 and 59.
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clude an express exclusion for plants and animals, so as to fulfill Canada’s obliga-
tions under NAFTA. Both options would be compatible with Canada’s interna-
tional obligations, but concrete action is required to clarify the position in Canada
with respect to genetically modified higher organisms, so as to adequately address
the ambiguities that would otherwise continue to plague the Schmeiser decision and
its interpretive legacy in future cases.
It is submitted, however, that recognizing genetically modified life forms as
patentable subject matter would be a more favourable strategy for Canada to adopt
as a major trading nation. It has been suggested that Canada needs to take more
concrete steps to harmonize its intellectual property standards with those of the
European Union and the United States if it wishes to be taken seriously by its trad-
ing partners.104 One of the main challenges facing Canada in its negotiations for
admission to the proposed Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agree-
ment (TPP), lauded as potentially the world’s most important trade pact,105 has
reportedly been Canada’s uncertain commitment to strengthening its intellectual
property standards, particularly in the field of the life sciences.106 Originally com-
prising Chile, New Zealand, Singapore and Brunei, the TPP seeks to further liber-
alize multilateral trade in the Asia-Pacific region, and the list of countries involved
in negotiations has grown to include Mexico, Peru, Malaysia and the United
States.107 The United States announced in 2008 that it would commence negotia-
tions with the original four members to join the TPP.108 Although Canada had
joined the TPP talks as an observer in 2010, the United States and New Zealand
had objected to Canada’s admission to the Agreement, citing concerns over agricul-
tural policy and intellectual property rights protection.109 While Canada has an-
nounced that it has recently joined the TPP negotiations at the invitation of Presi-
dent Barack Obama,110 its stand on the issue of intellectual property protection is
likely to have a significant impact on its prospects for membership in this multilat-
eral free trade agreement.
104 Peter Harder, “Canada must take necessary steps to clinch European Trade Agree-
ment”, The Globe and Mail (14 August 2012) at 5.
105 Michael Geist, “What’s Behind Canada’s Entry to the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Talks?” online: <http://www.thestar.com/business/article/1216011 — what-s-behind-
canada-s-entry-to-the-trans-pacific-partnership-talks> at 1.
106 Harder, supra note 104 at 5.
107 Geist, supra note 105 at 1.
108 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Trans-Pacific Partners and United
States Launch FTA Negotiations”, online: <http://www.ustr.gov/trans-pacific-partners-
and-united-states-launch-fta-negotiations>.
109 CD Howe Institute, “Can Canada Join the Trans-Pacific Partnership? Why Just Want-
ing it is Not Enough”, online: <http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/Commentary_340.pdf>, at
8: “A review of US official statements and speeches for 2010 makes it clear that
strengthened copyright protection was the major trade reform the US was seeking from
Canada”.
110 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “US Trade Representative Kirk
Welcomes Canada as a New Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiating Partner”, online:
<http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2012/june/ustr-kirk-
welcomes-canada-as-new-tpp-partner>.
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Some critics of the TPP have complained that the negotiations thus far have
been conducted behind closed doors, and shrouded in secrecy, reminiscent of the
Cold War era.111 It has also been suggested that involvement in the TPP negotia-
tion process may come at a heavy price, with membership in the Agreement being
contingent upon meeting the demands of its most powerful participant, the United
States.112 In particular, the “entry costs” for Canada have been argued to be partic-
ularly steep, given its rather “late entry” into the TPP process, and the lack of input
from Canada in the early stages of the negotiations.113 In this vein, the United
States’ invitation to Canada to join the negotiations has been described as an at-
tempt to bring about regulatory changes, including changes to intellectual property
standards, in Canada’s domestic economy through the “back door” of trade negoti-
ations.114 The economic benefits of membership in the TPP to Canada may also be
limited by the fact that Canada already has free trade agreements with four of the
ten participants, namely the United States, Mexico, Chile and Peru.115 Admission
to the TPP Agreement would therefore only grant access to a few relatively small
economies, including Vietnam, New Zealand, Malaysia and Brunei, which re-
present less than 1% of Canadian exports.116
It is indeed important to look beyond the patent law issue when weighing the
costs and benefits of membership in the TPP, and to consider the overall impact of
participation in these negotiations on Canada’s regulatory sovereignty and domestic
economy. Although it is true that Canada already has access, through free trade
agreements, to the markets of some of the participants in the TPP negotiations,
economic factors may form only part of the rationale for joining the Agreement.
Membership in the TPP may help Canada improve its diplomatic and cultural ties
with emerging economies in the Asia Pacific, increase the level of foreign direct
investment, and strengthen Canada’s political leverage in the region. It is also note-
worthy that the TPP is still in its early stages of development, and as it matures as a
free trade agreement, its future membership may include powerful players in the
Asia Pacific region, such as South Korea and China.117 Already, Japan has ex-
pressed preliminary interest in joining the Agreement, and along with Canada and
Mexico, would bring participation in the regime to 12 states, culminating in what
would be known as the “TPP-12”.118 It is accordingly important for Canada to
include these considerations into its “calculus” of the costs and benefits of seeking
admission to the TPP.
Substantively aligning its patent practices with other major industrialized
111 Eric Stadius & Elizabeth Briggs, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Free Trade at What
Costs?”, Eurasia Review, 22 August 2012, online:
<http://www.eurasiareview.com/22082012-the-trans-pacific-partnership-free-trade-at-
what-costs-analysis/>.
112 Geist, supra note 105 at 4-5.
113 Ibid at 4.
114 Ibid at 3.
115 Ibid at 2.
116 Ibid at 7.
117 See Stadius & Briggs, supra note 111 at 29.
118 Ibid.
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countries may also bring about additional economic benefits for Canada through
other free trade agreements. For example, economic studies have suggested that the
successful conclusion of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA), a proposed free trade and copyright agreement with the European Union,
would result in a boost of $12 billion dollars in economic activity for Canada, and
grant access to the world’s largest common market of 500 million consumers.119
While the CETA’s intellectual property provisions relate primarily to copyright
standards, the importance of strengthening trade relations with other developed na-
tions and emerging economies suggests that it would be in Canada’s economic in-
terest to harmonize its intellectual property standards with those of the United
States and the European Union, and to recognize genetically modified life forms as
patentable subject matter — a practice that Canada has already begun to adopt in
substance if not in form.
CONCLUSION
As biotechnology research continues to make inroads into the realm of the life
sciences, patent examiners and other policy makers will continue to grapple with
the ethical and legal implications of extending protection to increasingly novel and
unique inventions. As the frontiers of biotechnology law are constantly defined and
redefined by national laws and state practices, so too will the norms of international
patent law be reshaped by ongoing dialogue between states and other stakeholders
in the international community.
This article has sought to highlight an interesting trend among developed na-
tions to extend patent protection to genetically modified higher life forms, and to
situate Canada’s position within this trend. Led by the United States and the Euro-
pean Union, this trend has been gaining momentum in recent years with the modifi-
cation of Canada’s approach toward the patentability of genes and cells within
higher life forms. I have argued that the Supreme Court’s groundbreaking interpre-
tations of “patentable subject matter” and the infringement doctrine in Schmeiser
have substantially (though not formally) aligned Canada’s position with that of the
United States and the European Union.
Despite this growing trend toward support for the patent protection of higher
life forms in major industrialized countries, this practice has yet to crystallize into
an international treaty norm. However, the normative growth in the field of bio-
technology law appears to be following a “bifurcated” model — a more mature
norm in favour of accepting the patentability of lower life forms, and a less estab-
lished one for higher life forms. In view of the more established consensus in fa-
vour of protecting microorganisms and bacteria as forms of patentable subject mat-
ter, it would appear that such a practice is closer to becoming accepted as a norm of
international patent law, while the patenting of higher life forms will need to garner
more support from the international community, especially developing countries,
before it is likely to be incorporated into treaty provisions relating to trade and
intellectual property rights in genetically modified life forms.
The practical implications of this “bifurcated model” is that patent filers
should be circumspect about their prospects of obtaining patent protection for mod-
119 Harder, supra note 104 at 4.
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ified life forms in newly industrialising economies, and to some extent, even in
mature intellectual property systems like Canada. While a patent claim for higher
life forms is more likely to succeed in the “developed West”, prospective patentees
should be aware that the success or failure of their patent application may very well
depend on how their claim is drafted. In Canada, for instance, patentees would be
well advised to frame their patent claim in respect of modified cells or genes, rather
than over entire organisms, for as long as Schmeiser remains good law. In addition,
the prospect of obtaining patent protection for life forms in general is uncertain at
best in emerging economies with fledgling research and development sectors. The
extent to which patent norms are accepted across various regimes in the interna-
tional legal landscape is therefore a key factor that ought to be taken into account
by R&D firms and inventors in crafting their patent drafting strategies to suit indi-
vidual markets and intellectual property systems.
Despite the strides that Canada has made in the field of biotechnology law,
Schmeiser remains, at best, a half-hearted embrace of genetically modified life
forms as patentable subject matter. Yet the practical effect of the Schmeiser deci-
sion is that patented cells and genes now confer de facto control over the entire
organism, owing to the broad approach to “use” and “infringement” adopted by the
majority in the Supreme Court of Canada. The distinction that the court continues
to maintain between the patenting of cells and the patenting of organisms is, for
practical purposes, indefensible. By recognizing genetically modified components
as patentable, Canada has already taken a bold step forward — some might say a
step across an ethical boundary — by granting property rights in life. It is therefore
illogical, and perhaps even intellectually dishonest, to grant patent rights over mod-
ified genetic components embedded in life forms, while in the same breath denying
patent rights over the life forms themselves. It is perhaps time for Canada to liber-
ate itself from the artificial interpretive constraints of the Harvard College ruling,
and to more explicitly allow inventors to reap the fruits of their biotechnological
innovations. Doing so would place Canada in step with the patent practices of its
major trading partners, and enable it to play a more influential role in ongoing trade
negotiations. 
